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Clerk of the Court
Superior Court of CA County of Santa Clara

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COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

In re the

THE TABATA LIVING TRUST dated October 24,1986, as amended

Lead Case No. 16PR178371

For Consolidated Matters: Case No. 16CV298516 Case No. 16CV298424

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART TRUSTEES' SUPPLEMENT TO PETITION FOR ORDER SETTLING ACCOUNT

In April 2019, the parties in the above-captioned matter appeared for trial on the Petition for Order Settling Account, Approving Acts of Trustees, for Instructions, and for Partial Distribution (Initial Accounting Petition), filed July 22, 2016, and the Supplement to the Accounting Petition, filed August 23, 2016, by Trustees George and Jean Neyama, and the Petition for Removal and Replacement of Trustees (Removal Petition), filed December 18, 2017, by Objector Kathy Sugishita. Although the court took the matter under submission after the parties' filing of written closing arguments and responses, the parties thereafter stipulated to vacate submission as to the Removal Petition and the Supplement to the Accounting Petition, pending a renewed exploration of settlement following the court's October 18, 2019

announcement of its tentative decision to deny the Accounting Petition. In the course of settlement negotiations, the Neyamas on November 18, 2019, filed a Petition for Order Settling Revised and Final Account (Revised Accounting Petition), which effectively superseded the Initial Accounting Petition that had been a principal subject of the parties' protracted litigation. What remains is the Neyamas' Supplement to the Accounting Petition, as orally amended May 8, 2019, in which the Neyamas seek to disinherit both Kathy² and Tim by application of the nocontest provision of both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Trust. The court grants the Neyamas' request as to Kathy Sugishita and denies it without prejudice as to Tim.

DISCUSSION

As is pertinent here, Trustees seek an order deeming both Kathy and Tim to have predeceased the Tabatas by application of the no-contest provision of the Tabata Living Trust dated October 24, 1986, as amended (Trust). "'Although no contest clauses are valid and favored by the public policies of discouraging litigation and giving effect to the testator's intent, they are also disfavored by the policy against forfeitures and therefore are strictly construed and may not extend beyond what plainly was the testator's intent.' [Citation.]" (*Betts v. City National Bank* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 222, 232.)

Under Article XIII of the Trust, "[i]f any beneficiary of this Trust shall contest in any court any of the provisions of this instrument, or the validity of the Living Trust, then the beneficial interest herein of any such person shall thereupon terminate, and the portions of the income and principal of the Trust Estate otherwise provided to be paid to such beneficiary shall instead be paid and distributed as though such person had died without issue before becoming entitled to receive income or any portion of the principal of the Trust Estate." The First and

Accounting Petition rendered moot the court's October 18, 2019 tentative decision, so the court respectfully declines the Neyamas' unsolicited Proposed Statement of Decision. The court at an unrelated hearing on November 25, 2019, also reserved ruling on the Removal Petition pending notice to the beneficiaries and potential objectors of the Revised Accounting Petition and the February 27, 2020 hearing thereon.

² In view of the shared surname of certain of the parties, the court will resort to given names for ease of reference. No disrespect is intended.

Second Amendments to the Declaration of Trust omit any further no-contest provision. The Third Amendment to the Declaration of Trust, executed by Janet Tabata after Flyer Tabata's death, likewise omits any additional no-contest provision. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Declaration of Trust, provide: "If any beneficiary under this document or the document it amends singly or in conjunction with any other person or persons files a direct contest without probable cause that alleges the invalidity of (a) this document, the document it amends, or any of their terms or (b) any will or codicil of the Settlor or any of their terms, which is in existence on the date this document is executed, then the right of that beneficiary to take any interest given to the beneficiary by this document or the document it amends shall be void, and any interest to which the beneficiary would have been entitled shall pass as if the beneficiary had predeceased the Settlor without descendants. As used in this section the terms 'direct contest' and 'probable cause' shall have the meanings given in California Probate Code Sections 21310 and 21311, or any successor statute." ³

I. "Direct Contest"

A "direct contest" under Probate Code section 21310 "means a contest that alleges the invalidity of a protected instrument or one or more of its terms, based on one or more of the following grounds: [¶] (1) Forgery. [¶] (2) Lack of due execution. [¶] (3) Lack of capacity. [¶] (4) Menace, duress, fraud, or undue influence." (Prob. Code, § 21310, subd. (b).) A "[p]rotected instrument" includes "the instrument that contains the no-contest clause." (Prob. Code, § 21310, subds. (b) and (e)(1).) "Instrument," in turn, is defined as a "writing that designates a beneficiary or makes a donative transfer of property." (Prob. Code, § 45.) An amendment to a trust can be an instrument under this definition. (See, e.g., *Aviles v. Swearingen* (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 485 (*Aviles*).) The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are not, strictly speaking, "instruments" within the meaning of Probate Code section 45 in its present iteration, because they serve only to identify successor trustees, not beneficiaries or the eventual disposition of trust assets. It is also true that

³ The Fourth Amendment to the Trust includes the same no-contest language as the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but Kathy Sugishita does not challenge any provision of this amendment.

"[t]he court must strictly construe a no contest clause because it works a forfeiture and may not be extended beyond its plainly intended function." (*Aviles*, *supra*, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 490.) But in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the "plainly intended function" of the no-contest provision's first clause is explicitly to forestall a contest to "this document" – not merely statutorily defined "instruments" – the Fifth and Sixth Amendments themselves. Kathy's belated effort to obtain cancellation of these amendments is therefore a direct contest.

II. Probable Cause

"[P]robable cause exists if, at the time of filing a contest, the facts known to the contestant would cause a reasonable person to believe that there is a reasonable likelihood that the requested relief will be granted after an opportunity for further investigation or discovery." (Prob. Code, § 21311, subd. (b).) "The former standard referred only to the contestant's factual contentions. By contrast, subdivision (b) refers to the granting of relief, which requires not only the proof of factual contentions but also a legally sufficient ground for the requested relief." (Cal. Law Revision Com. Com., 54A West's Ann. Prob. Code (2008 ed.) foll. § 21311.) The court find that probable cause is defeated both by Kathy's forfeiture of her right to contest the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and by her voluntary relinquishment of that known right. The forfeiture occurred when Kathy failed to file her contest within the 120 days required by Probate Code section 16061.8; the waiver was entered when Kathy represented to the Neyamas that she would not challenge their appointment as successor trustees — despite her expressed reservations as to the propriety of that appointment — in conjunction with a request for compensation which she thereafter received.

To the extent Kathy relies upon the availability of evidence potentially underlying her claim of elder abuse to satisfy the probable cause standard, nothing in the record of the noticed hearings at which application of the no-contest clause was to be considered would permit the court to conclude, as Kathy has argued, that the limitations period applicable for a complaint for damages under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act operates to extend the 120-day period under Probate Code section 16061.8. The four-year limitations period for financial elder abuse claims under the elder abuse statute applies only to "[a]n action for

damages pursuant to Sections 15657.5 and 15657.6..." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.7, italics added.)

III. Tim Sugishita

The Neyamas' conviction that Tim and Kathy have operated in concert is understandable in view of the marital relationship and the alignment of their interests. Their conviction, however honestly achieved or even correct, is unsupported by the record. To extend the application of the no-contest clause based solely on what may be intuitively sound incredulity in the face of a studied posture of nonchalance performed by a beneficiary or his counsel would, absent record evidence, violate the clear public policy mandating narrow application of such forfeiture provisions. (See, e.g., *Aviles*, *supra*, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 490.) Rhetorically lumping the spouses together or correctly identifying their shared interests does not, without more, make Tim legally responsible for Kathy's litigation or her litigation tactics. The court therefore denies the Neyamas' request to deem Tim Sugishita to have violated the no-contest clause.

It is so ordered.

Dated: March 17, 2020

ÉYNTHIA C. LIE Judge of the Superior Court